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THE NCAA IS DROPPING THE BALL:
REFINING THE RIGHTS OF STUDENT-ATHLETES
INTRODUCTION
“Clearly, the collegiate model is dead.”1  Collegiate athletics resem-
ble more of a big business than an organization whose purpose is the
protection and academic advancement of student-athletes.2  These
athletic programs yield large revenues that fund significant portions of
university budgets, begging the question: Should student-athletes be
compensated as employees?  The National Collegiate Athletic Associ-
ation (NCAA) has recently been the subject of numerous lawsuits re-
garding the rights of student-athletes.  In the past year, both
Northwestern University & Collegiate Athletes Players Ass’n3 and
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n4 significantly changed
the way student-athletes are viewed within the NCAA.  In Northwest-
ern University, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) decided that the Northwestern football players were
employees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),5 mean-
ing that these Northwestern student-athletes could take part in collec-
tive bargaining.6  Northwestern University appealed this decision, and
on August 17, 2015, the NLRB reached a unanimous decision not to
assert jurisdiction and dismissed the petition without deciding whether
the Northwestern football players were employees.7  In O’Bannon,
the court held that the NCAA rules prohibiting player compensation
are an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Sherman Antitrust
Act, specifically with regard to the use of players’ names, images, and
1. Pete Thamel, Commissioner Steps Down Amid Big East’s Instability, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/sports/ncaabasketball/john-marinatto-resigns-as-big-
east-commissioner.html?_r=0 (quoting John Marinatto, former Big East Commissioner).
2. For the purpose of this Comment, “student-athlete” is limited to revenue-generating Divi-
sion I men’s football and basketball programs.
3. See generally No. 13-RC-121359, 2014–2015 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 16781 (Mar. 26, 2014),
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/12-RC-121359 http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458166
7b6f [hereinafter NLRB, Northwestern Univ.] (holding that the student-athletes were employees
of Northwestern University).
4. See generally 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, O’Bannon v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-16601, 2015 WL 5712106 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015) (hold-
ing that the NCAA rules prohibiting player compensation were an unreasonable restraint of
trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1935).
6. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 23. R
7. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015) [hereinafter NLRB, Northwest-
ern Univ. Appeal].
171
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likenesses.8  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this portion
of the decision on September 30, 2015.9
Student-athletes should be compensated for the benefits they pro-
vide to both their universities and the NCAA.  Student-athletes are
unique in that they are subject to a reverse life cycle of employment;
instead of their wages and earning capacity increasing over their ca-
reer, their productivity and skills are only valuable for a significantly
shorter period of time in their youth.  Consequently, student-athletes
should be able to profit off of their lucrative skill set while they have
the ability to do so.  Arguments against compensation are tantamount
to a form of age discrimination.  Although discrimination against the
young is not recognized by law,10 discrimination against a group of
people based on their age is not acceptable; the only difference is that
the law extends protection to one age group and not the other.11  As a
consequence of discrimination and the reverse life cycle of employ-
ment, tangible consequences adversely affect a specific group of peo-
ple: student-athletes.  These athletes need protection and recognizing
them as employees can afford them this protection.
Part II of this Comment provides the history of the NCAA and dis-
cusses the fundamental ways in which the NCAA has changed since
its formation, which is integral to understanding why the current struc-
ture of the NCAA is outdated.12  Part II also provides relevant back-
ground information for Northwestern University and the legal
significance of allowing players to unionize.13  Further, Part II dis-
8. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007–08.
9. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-16601, 2015 WL 5712106, at *29 (9th
Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).  However, the court did not hold that the district court clearly erred in
finding that students could “receive [name, images, and likenesses] NIL cash payments unteth-
ered to their educational expenses.” Id. at *24.
10. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994), this Comment
does not propose that the young should be statutorily protected under this Act; however, it does
propose that they should be protected by the NLRA, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and
antitrust law.
11. Congress passed the ADEA, which made it illegal for an employer “to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
age.”  Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimina-
tion?: The ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 785 (1997) (quoting Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4, 81 Stat. 602, 603 (1967)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1))).  The protected group under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA) includes “‘any individual’ age forty and older.”  Kelly J.
Hartzler, Note, Reverse Age Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Protecting All Members of the Protected Class, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 217, 218 (2003) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).
12. See infra notes 20–51 and accompanying text. R
13. See infra notes 54–112 and accompanying text. R
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cusses the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the U.S. Department of
Labor’s six-factor test for determining whether interns at a for-profit
business are employees, and the O’Bannon decision’s significance in
the conversation about student-athletes’ right to be compensated.14
Lastly, Part II discusses age discrimination and the theory of reverse
age discrimination as it relates to student-athletes.15  Part III provides
an analysis of student-athletes’ rights under the NLRA, the FLSA,
and antitrust law.16  Part III also proposes a model of payment that
would properly compensate student-athletes for the hours they com-
mit to their athletic programs.17  Part IV explores some of the policy
implications of compensating athletes and explains that the new
changes to the NCAA will not adversely affect the collegiate sports
industry.18  Part IV also addresses how the ability to collectively bar-
gain will benefit student-athletes in many respects.19
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of the NCAA and Where It Stands Today
The presidents of sixty-two U.S. colleges and universities founded
the NCAA in  1905 to create a uniform set of rules to regulate inter-
collegiate football.20  Today, the NCAA operates as a private, volun-
tary association with over 1,000 active members, 346 of which are
Division I colleges or universities.21  The NCAA annually publishes a
manual, which lays out the rules and regulations that govern college
athletics.22  Member institutions must implement and apply these reg-
ulations, otherwise, the institutions may be subjected to NCAA en-
forcement procedures.23  The NCAA holds exclusive power in
14. See infra notes 118–57 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 160–294 and accompanying text. R
17. See infra notes 295–325 and accompanying text. R
18. See infra notes 326–60 and accompanying text. R
19. See id.
20. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-16601, 2015 WL
5712106 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).
21. Composition and Sport Sponsorship of the Membership, NCAA (2014), http://www.ncaa
.org/about/who-we-are/membership/composition-and-sport-sponsorship-membership.  “Division
I schools generally have the biggest student bodies, manage the largest athletics budgets and
offer the most generous number of scholarships.” NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa
.org/about?division=d1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).  Division I schools commit to maintaining a
high academic standard for student-athletes in addition to providing them with a wide range of
opportunities. Id.
22. NCAA, 2014-15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1 (2014), http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/.
23. Id.
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creation and enforcement of the bylaws.24  According to the NCAA
Manual, the NCAA seeks “[t]o initiate, simulate and improve inter-
collegiate athletics programs for student-athletes and to promote and
develop educational leadership, physical fitness, athletics excellence
and athletics participation as a recreational pursuit.”25  Member insti-
tutions’ competitive athletic programs are intended to be a fundamen-
tal and vital aspect of the education system.26  A basic purpose of the
NCAA is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of
the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the stu-
dent body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”27  To maintain its
purpose and goals, the NCAA develops and outlines rules for its
membership institutions’ athletic programs in the NCAA constitution
and bylaws.28
The NCAA’s membership institutions are divided into three Divi-
sions: I, II, and III.29  Division designation is dependent on the
school’s ability to provide opportunities to student-athletes for their
participation in intercollegiate athletics.30  Schools identified as Divi-
sion I “provide the greatest number and highest quality of opportuni-
ties” to student-athletes by sponsoring more athletic teams and
providing student-athletes with more financial aid as compared to Di-
vision II and III schools.31  For football, Division I schools are further
organized into two subdivisions: the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS)
and the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS).32  FBS schools are
permitted to offer eighty-five full scholarships to their football play-
ers.33  FCS schools may offer up to sixty-three full scholarships annu-
ally.34  The level of competition in FBS is considered higher than in
FCS.35
24. See id.
25. Id. (Constitution, Article 1.2).
26. Id. (Constitution, Article 1.3.1).
27. Id.
28. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-16601, 2015 WL
5712106 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015); NCAA, supra note 22.
29. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 963.
32. Id. at 964.
33. Id.
34. Id.; College Athletic Scholarship Limits, SCHOLARSHIP STATS, http://www.scholarshipstats
.com/ncaalimits.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2015).
35. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 964.
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Division I schools, for both football and basketball, are further or-
ganized into conferences that function as smaller leagues within the
NCAA.36  The conferences organize their regular season games and
tournaments.37  Each conference must comply with the NCAA’s con-
stitution and bylaws; however, the conferences do operate indepen-
dently in generating their own revenue and creating their own rules
consistent with NCAA policy.38
The NCAA Manual preserves the principle of amateurism39 and
states that “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate
sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by educa-
tion and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.  Stu-
dent participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and
student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional
and commercial enterprises.”40  This means that student-athletes are
prohibited from receiving remuneration beyond their athletic scholar-
ships for their athletic services.41  Article 12 of the NCAA’s operating
bylaws restrict the amateur athletes’ ability to obtain compensation
for their athletic prowess beyond what they receive in scholarship
money, including any profits resulting from their names or like-
nesses.42  Any remuneration above the university’s permissible schol-
arship will result in the student-athletes losing their amateur status
and being ineligible for collegiate athletics.43
The NCAA and its member institutions make an immense profit off
of amateur athletes and have an interest in renouncing them as em-
ployees.44  In 2013, the NCAA made “$913 million in total revenue”
and “$852 million in total expenses,” amounting to a $61 million
36. NCAA and NAIA Divisional and Conference Affiliations, 2015 C. FOOTBALL, http://
prwolfe.bol.ucla.edu/cfootball/conferences.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2015); see Divisional Differ-
ences and the History of Multidivision Classification, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-
are/membership/divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-classification (last visited Feb.
27, 2015).
37. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 964.
38. Id.
39. Amateurism is a fundamental principle of college athletics because it is the main distinc-
tion between student-athletes and professionals. Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/ama-
teurism (last visited Oct. 21, 2015).  Principals of amateurism and the NCAA rules ensure that
student-athletes put academics first and athletics second. Id.  A key principle of amateurism is
that “student-athletes should be protected from exploitation.”  NCAA, supra note 22, at 4 (Con- R
stitution, Article 2.9).
40. NCAA, supra note 22, at 4 (Constitution, Article 2.9). R
41. Justin C. Vine, Note, Leveling the Playing Field: Student Athletes Are Employees of Their
University, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 235, 242–43 (2013).
42. NCAA, supra note 22, at 58–86 (Bylaw, Article 12). R
43. Id. at 59.
44. Vine, supra note 41, at 242. R
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profit.45  A majority of this amount ($681 million) was derived from
the multimedia and marketing rights agreement connected to March
Madness, the Men’s Division I basketball tournament.46  The NCAA
distributed $527 million to Division I schools and conferences.47
Membership institutions also make significant revenues off of their
athletic programs, especially with football. Forbes documented the
revenues and expenses of the top twenty-five football teams for the
2011–2012 season, most notably: Texas ($103,813,684 in revenue with
$25,896,203 in expenses), Michigan ($85,209,247 in revenue and
$23,640,337 in expenses), Alabama ($81,993,762 in revenue and
$36,918,963 in expenses), Georgia ($74,989,418 in revenue and
$22,710,140 in expenses), and Florida ($74,117,435 in revenue and
$23,045,846 in expenses).48
College basketball also contributes significant revenues to universi-
ties and the NCAA. Forbes ranked college basketball’s most valuable
teams in 2014 as follows: Louisville ($39.5 million), Kansas ($33 mil-
lion), Kentucky ($32 million), North Carolina ($25.7 million), Indiana
($25.4 million), Arizona ($25.2 million), Ohio State ($22.9 million),
Wisconsin ($21.1 million), Syracuse ($21 million), and Duke ($14.9
million).49
Schools invest a significant amount of money in their athletic de-
partments with the hopes of generating even more profits.50  For some
of these teams, the key to their program’s success is big spending,
while for other teams, much of their revenue is gained from strong
licensing programs.51
45. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Has Net Assets of $627 Million, Say Records, USA TODAY (Mar.
20, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/03/20/ncaa-expenses-reve-
nue-money-mark-emmert/6651133/.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Alicia Jessop, Contributor, The Economics of College Football: A Look at the Top-25
Teams’ Revenues and Expenses, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2013, 10:32 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
aliciajessop/2013/08/31/the-economics-of-college-football-a-look-at-the-top-25-teams-revenues-
and-expenses/.  This chart reflects data obtained from the Department of Education. Id.  Al-
though the Department of Education does not provide solid reporting guidelines, it “is the only
data publically available related to athletic departments’ spending and revenue generation.” Id.
49. Chris Smith, College Basketball’s Most Valuable Teams 2014: Louisville Cardinals on Top
Again, FORBES (Mar. 17, 2014, 9:29 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2014/03/17/col-
lege-basketballs-most-valuable-teams-2014-louisville-cardinals-on-top-again/.
50. William W. Berry III, Educating Athletes: Re-Envisioning the Student-Athlete Model, 81
TENN. L. REV. 795, 805 (2014).
51. See Jessop, supra note 48.  A strong licensing program may entail teams that either have R
their own network or are a part of a conference that has its own network. Id.  Merchandising
may also provide an extra stream of revenue for the university and their athletic program. See
id.
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B. The Northwestern University Student-Athletes’ Petition
Kain Colter, a Northwestern football player, filed a petition with
the NLRB, asking the Board to recognize Northwestern football play-
ers as employees of their university who are eligible to unionize.52  In
the petition, grant-in-aid football players claimed that they were em-
ployees of Northwestern University under the NLRA and were there-
fore entitled to representation for collective bargaining purposes.53  In
March 2014, the NLRB Director for Region 13 issued a decision in
Northwestern University, finding that the student-athletes were in fact
employees.54
The employer, Northwestern University, is a private, nonprofit un-
dergraduate university located in Illinois that maintains its intercolle-
giate athletic program as a part of the NCAA.55  Northwestern is part
of the Big Ten Conference,56 and its Division I football team competes
against eleven other member colleges.57  Patrick Fitzgerald has been
the head football coach since 2006.58  The football team has about 112
players, of which, eighty-five receive grant-in-aid scholarships to cover
their tuition, fees, room, board, and books.59  The remainder of the
team consists of walk-ons who only receive need-based financial aid if
they qualify.60  When making a scholarship offer to a recruit, Coach
Fitzgerald provides the individual with a National Letter of Intent and
a four-year scholarship, also known as a “tender.”61  The tender ex-
plains to the recruit that the scholarship can be reduced or canceled
under a variety of circumstances.62  The tender also explains that the
52. Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, 69 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 65, 65–67 (2014).
53. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 2. R
54. Brian Bennett, Northwestern Players Get Union Vote, ESPN (Mar. 27, 2014, 9:23 AM),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10677763/northwestern-wildcats-football-players-
win-bid-unionize.
55. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 2. R
56. The Big Ten Conference is the oldest and one of the more successful Division I collegiate
athletic conferences in the United States. See About the Conference, BIG TEN, http://www.bigten
.org/school-bio/big10-school-bio.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2015).
57. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 2. R
58. Id. at 3.  Coach Fitzpatrick is the second-longest tenured Big Ten head coach and has now
served eight seasons at Northwestern. See Staff Directory: Pat Fitzgerald, NU SPORTS, http://
www.nusports.com/staff.aspx?staff=89 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
59. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 3. R
60. Id. at 3 n.3.
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id.
If the player: (1) renders himself ineligible from intercollegiate competition; (2) en-
gages in serious misconduct warranting substantial disciplinary action; (3) engages in
conduct resulting in criminal charges; (4) abuses team rules as determined by the coach
or athletic administration; (5) voluntarily withdraws from the sport at any time for any
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scholarship cannot be reduced on the basis of athletic ability or in-
jury.63  To accept Northwestern’s offer, the recruit must agree to these
terms.64
The NLRB applied the common law definition in deciding whether
the Northwestern football players were employees.65  “Under the
common law [definition], an employee is a person who performs ser-
vices for another under a contract of hire, subject to the other’s con-
trol or right of control, and in return for payment.”66  When applying
the common law test, the NLRB Regional Director examined whether
the grant-in-aid scholarship football players: (1) performed services
for the benefit of the employer; (2) received compensation for those
services; and (3) were subjected to the employer’s control in the per-
formance of their duties as football players.67
The NLRB reasoned that the football players performed valuable
services for Northwestern University.68  The Northwestern football
program generated $235 million in revenues from 2003–2012 through
ticket sales, television contracts, merchandise sales, and licensing
agreements.69  Northwestern utilized this economic benefit in any way
it chose.70  Northwestern also received a benefit because of its reputa-
tion of having a winning football team, which likely influenced alumni
contributions and increased the number of applicants applying to the
university.71  The Board found that Northwestern’s goal was to “field
the most competitive team possible.”72  To accomplish this, players are
recruited based on their athletic ability.73  In return for the athletic
services student-athletes provide to Northwestern, they receive schol-
arships that serve as their compensation.74  The scholarships last up to
reason; (6) accepts compensation for participating in an athletic contest in his sport; or
(7) agrees to be represented by an agent.
Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 13. R
66. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 n.27 (2004) (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec.,
Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)).
67. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 14–15. R
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 14.  “[A]thletic departments spare no ex- R
pense when attempting to recruit the best high school athletes” due to the immense pressure
from fans to win games.  Berry, supra note 50, at 805. R
74. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 14. R
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five years and cover tuition, fees, room, board, and books.75  These
scholarships are valued at $76,000 per calendar year; each player will
receive over $250,000 throughout the course of four or five years.76
Additionally, the players sign a tender, which operates as an employ-
ment contract and memorializes the duration as well as conditions
under which each student-athlete is to be compensated.77  Because
student-athletes are forbidden from receiving additional compensa-
tion derived from their athletic ability or reputation under NCAA
regulation, the players are dependent on their scholarships to cover
their basic needs.78  The coach may reduce or cancel these scholar-
ships under a variety of circumstances.79  Because the scholarship can
be immediately reduced or canceled (under certain circumstances),
the Board determined that the scholarship is in fact tied to the stu-
dent-athlete’s performance of athletic services.80
The NLRB also considered the amount of control Northwestern
had over the players.81  The season begins with a training camp, which
starts six weeks prior to the academic year.82  The coaches prepare
daily itineraries containing each player’s football related activities,
which take place from 5:45 AM to 10:30 PM.83  During preseason, this
rigorous schedule requires players to dedicate fifty to sixty hours per
week toward the Northwestern football program.84  During the regu-
lar season, which takes place from September through November, the
team competes in twelve games against other colleges on almost every
Saturday.85  Moreover, throughout the regular season, players dedi-
cate forty to fifty hours per week to football.86  These hours are spent
at practices, meetings, film sessions, workouts, and both traveling to
and competing in games.87  Once the academic year begins, the
NCAA limits “countable athletically related activities”88 (CARA)
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.; Vine, supra note 41, at 243–44. See generally NCAA, supra note 22, at 57–60 (listing R
the rules on scholarships, payments, and expenses).
79. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 15. R
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 6. R
86. Id. at 15.
87. Id. at 15–16.
88. NCAA rules limit the players “countable athletically related activities” (CARA) to
20 hours per week from the first regular season game until the final regular season
game (or until the end of the Employer’s fall quarter in the [case where the team]
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hours to twenty hours per week; however, the players realistically
devote forty to fifty hours despite this regulation.89  The Board found
that the coaches control “nearly every aspect of the players’ private
lives [based on] rules that they must follow under threat of discipline
[or] loss of a scholarship.”90  The players are restricted and must ob-
tain their coaches’ permission before they can: “(1) make living ar-
rangements; (2) apply for outside employment; (3) drive personal
vehicles; (4) travel off campus; (5) post items on the Internet; (6)
speak to the media; (7) use alcohol and drugs; (8) and engage in gam-
bling.”91  Northwestern University also controls the players’ academic
education.92  Scholarship players are sometimes unable to take partic-
ular courses in a certain academic quarter if they conflict with prac-
tice.93  It is not uncommon for players to occasionally miss classes to
travel for away football games.94  Unlike other students at the univer-
sity, freshman football players must attend study hall for six hours per
week, and all players are afforded access to certain tutoring and advis-
ing services that are unavailable to nonathlete students.  Players must
also participate in the NU for Life Program each year.95
The Regional Director found that the football players earning full
grant-in-aid scholarships constituted employees under Section 2(3) of
the NLRA but that the walk-on players did not.96  Unlike the grant-
in-aid scholarship players, the walk-on players do not receive compen-
qualifies for a Bowl game).  The CARA total also cannot exceed four hours per day
and the players are required to have one day off every week . . . .  [T]he fact that the
players devote well over 20 actual hours per week on football-related activities does not
violate the NCAA’s CARA limitations [because] numerous activities such as travel,
mandatory training meetings, voluntary weight conditioning or strength training, medi-
cal check-ins, training tape review and required attendance at “training table” are not
counted by the NCAA.
Id. at 6 n.11. The Northwestern team finds ways around this hour requirement.  Willborn, supra
note 49, at 75, 75 n.69.  For example, Northwestern football players “regularly hold 7-on-7 drills”
without their coaches being present. Id. at 6–7.  “[T]hese drills are scheduled by the quarterback
and held in the football team’s indoor facility in the evening.” Id. at 7.  During these drills, “a
student athletic trainer is also present . . . to provide medical assistance.” Id.
89. Id. at 16.
90. Id.
91. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 16.
92. Id. at 16–17.
93. Id. at 16.
94. Id. at 16.
95. Id. This program assists student-athletes with their professional development so they can
excel once completing their degree. Id. at 12. See generally NU for Life, NU FOR LIFE, http://
nusports.com/sports/2015/3/18/GEN_2014010158.aspx?path=nuforlife (last visited Aug. 23, 2015)
(“NU for Life is a unique program dedicated to the professional development of Northwestern
student-athletes.”).
96. Id. at 17.
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sation for the athletic services they perform, do not sign a tender, and
are not subject to as much control from the football coaches.97
The Regional Director rejected Northwestern University’s argu-
ments that the players were not employees and that their status was
more analogous to the graduate students in Brown University.98  “In
Brown University, the [NLRB] held that graduate students . . . who
worked as teaching assistants, research assistants, and proctors, were
not ‘employees’ . . . [because] they were ‘primarily students.’”99  Un-
like student-athletes, the Brown University students’ relationship with
the university was primarily educational.100  The Board found that
“the players’ football-related duties are unrelated to their academic
studies unlike the graduate assistants [in Brown University] whose
teaching and research duties were inextricably related to their gradu-
ate degree requirements.”101  Even though the Brown University test
was inapplicable in this case, the football players would still be consid-
ered employees, if it was applied.102  The Regional Director also re-
jected Northwestern University’s argument that the football players
were temporary employees.103
The Regional Director ordered an election to decide whether the
eligible voters desired to be represented for collective bargaining pur-
poses by the College Athletes Players Association (CAPA).104  Eligi-
ble voters to the collective bargaining process included all grant-in-aid
scholarship football players who had playing eligibility.105
This decision was appealed.106  In its unanimous decision, the Board
did not determine whether the Northwestern football players consti-
97. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 17.
98. Id. at 18 (citing Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004)).
99. Willborn, supra note 52, at 72 (citing Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 494). R
100. Id. at 72–73 (quoting Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487).  In Northwestern University the
Board considered:  (1) whether the student-athletes were primarily students whose time is dedi-
cated to academia; (2) whether the student-athletes’ duties were a core element of their educa-
tional degree requirements; (3) whether the University’s academic faculty had supervision over
the student-athletes’ athletic duties; and (4) whether the student-athletes’ compensation was
considered financial aid or compensation.  NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 18–20 R
(considering the Brown University factors)
101. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 18. R
102. Id. at 18–20.
103. Id. at 20–21.
104. Id. at 23.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 4, 24 (order granting Northwestern’s request for review of the decision); Order,
Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, (No. 13-RC-121359), 2014 WL 1653118
(N.L.R.B. Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-grants-request-re-
view-northwestern-university-athletes-case (granting Northwestern University’s request for re-
view of the decision).
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tuted employees under the NLRA.107  Instead, the Board chose to ex-
ercise its discretion not to assert jurisdiction because “it would not
effectuate the policies of the Act[,]” nor would it “promote stability in
labor relations[,]” particularly within the NCAA and FBS football.108
Consequently, the petition was dismissed.109  The Board based its de-
termination that a decision would not promote stability on two pri-
mary findings: (1) the nature of NCAA Division I FBS football,
namely the control that the leagues exercise over each individual
team; and (2) the structure and composition of FBS football (the
Board cannot assert jurisdiction over the majority of competitors be-
cause they are considered public institutions).110  Importantly, the
NLRB’s decision is limited to grant-in-aid scholarship football players
in the Northwestern petition.111  The Board stated that it “might as-
sert jurisdiction in another case involving grant-in-aid scholarship
football players [or other scholarship athletes].”112
C. The Fair Labor Standards Act
Congress enacted the FLSA to protect workers from harsh labor
conditions and to preserve a certain standard of living.113  The U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) Wage and Hour Division enforces the
FLSA’s minimum wage and hour restrictions.114  The Wage and Hour
Division has certain criteria under the FLSA to assist for-profit pri-
vate sector employers in determining whether interns must be paid
minimum wage and overtime.115
The FLSA broadly defines the term “employ” to mean “suffer or
permit to work.”116  If an individual falls under this definition, then
she must be compensated for the services that she provides to the em-
ployer.117  Interns are usually deemed to be employees unless they
107. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 1. R
108. Id.
109. Id. at 7.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 1 nn.2–3.
112. Id. at 1.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)–(b) (2012).
114. Id. § 204.
115. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PRO-
GRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2010), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compli-
ance/whdfs71.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEET #71].  “Individuals at non-profit firms and
government organizations are considered ‘volunteers’ and are therefore [not considered] in-
terns.”  Natalie Bacon, Note, Unpaid Internships: The History, Policy, and Future Implications of
“Fact Sheet #71”, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 67, 67–68 (2011).
116. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 115. R
117. Id.  For-profit firms must comply with Fact Sheet #71 or they may be prosecuted for labor
violations and be “liable for unpaid wages, compensatory damages, and additional liquidated
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meet the test for trainees.  “Interns in the ‘for-profit’ private sector
who qualify as employees rather than trainees typically must be paid
at least minimum wage and overtime compensation . . . .”118  If, how-
ever, the interns serve only their own interests or receive training only
for their own educational benefit, then they are not deemed
employees.119
To determine whether an internship or training program meets this
trainee exclusion under the FLSA, the court applies six criteria:
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the
facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be
given in an educational environment;
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but works under
close supervision of existing staff;
4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate
advantage from the activities of the intern, and on occasion its
operations may actually be impeded;
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of
the internship; and
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.120
If all of these factors are met, there is no employment relationship
under the FLSA.121  Consequently, the Act’s minimum wage and
overtime provisions do not apply, and the intern will not receive com-
pensation.122  The intern exclusion to employment is narrow. Thus,
many individuals are considered employees and are therefore subject
to the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions.123
D. O’Bannon v. NCAA
In 2009, a group of current and former college student-athletes who
play or played for an FBS football or Division I men’s basketball
damages.”  Patricia L. Reid, Note, Fact Sheet #71: Shortchanging the Unpaid Academic Intern, 66
FLA. L. REV. 1375, 1391 n.120 (2014) (quoting Kristi L. Schoepfer & Mark Dodds, Internships in
Sport Management Curriculum: Should Legal Implications of Experiential Learning Result in the
Elimination of the Sport Management Internship, 21 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 183, 198 (2010)).
118. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 115. R
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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team, brought an antitrust class action against the NCAA challenging
its rules that restricted player compensation in men’s football and bas-
ketball.124  The plaintiffs specifically challenged the NCAA rules that
barred student-athletes from receiving a portion of the revenue that
the NCAA and membership institutions earned from the sale of li-
censes that permitted the use of “student-athletes’ names, images, and
likenesses in videogames, live game telecasts, and other footage.”125
The NCAA currently imposes strict limits on student-athlete compen-
sation from schools by prohibiting any student-athlete from receiving
financial aid exceeding the value of the athlete’s full grant-in-aid
scholarship.126  The NCAA further restrains this amount by putting a
cap on the financial aid that exceeds the cost of attendance.127  Like-
wise, the NCAA “prohibits any student-athlete from receiving com-
pensation from outside sources based on his athletic skills or
ability.”128
Plaintiffs argued that the NCAA’s cap on financial aid and prohibi-
tion of student-athlete compensation violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act.129  The Sherman Antitrust Act’s purpose is to protect and secure
the competitive process, which requires market participants to reduce
their prices and increase the quality of their products to compete.130
Section 1 states: “Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is de-
clared to be illegal.”131  The plaintiffs claimed that the NCAA re-
strained trade in two related national markets: the college education
market and the group licensing market.132
The college education market refers to the market in which Divi-
sion I FBS football and basketball schools compete to recruit the most
talented high school players.133  The court concluded that these
schools compete to attract elite recruits by selling unique bundles of
goods and services.  The bundles include scholarships that cover “tui-
tion, fees, room and board, books, certain school supplies, tutoring,
124. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 955, 962–63 (N.D. Cal.
2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-16601,
2015 WL 5712106 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).
125. Id. at 963.
126. Id. at 971.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 972.
129. Id. at 963.
130. Rick Nolan, Comment, NCAA’s Call to the Bullpen: Bring in Congress to Save the Col-
lege Game with an Antitrust Exemption, 15 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 447, 450–51 (2014).
131. 15 U.S.C § 1 (2012).
132. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 965.
133. Id.
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and academic support services.  They also include access to high-qual-
ity coaching, medical treatment, state-of-the-art athletic facilities, and
opportunities to compete at the highest level of college sports.”134  In
exchange for these bundles of goods, recruits are required to provide
the university with athletic services and allow the schools to use their
names, images, and likenesses for commercial purposes.135  The court
concluded that Division I FBS football and basketball schools were
the only suppliers of these unique bundles of goods and services.
Once being offered a Division I scholarship, recruits often do not pur-
sue other options at different educational institutions or athletic ca-
reers outside of collegiate athletics.136  Division II and III schools (and
other professional football and basketball leagues) are not capable of
providing a substitute for this bundle of goods and services and com-
peting for the same top recruits.137
In addition to the college educational market, the court also consid-
ered the group licensing market.138  The plaintiffs alleged that in the
absence of the NCAA’s restraints, FBS football and Division I basket-
ball players, like professional athletes, would have the ability to sell
group licenses, which would grant others the ability to use their
names, images, and likenesses in each market.139  Both FBS football
and Division I basketball players could sell joint group licenses to
membership institutions, third party licensing companies, and other
media companies interested in using and profiting from the use of stu-
dent-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.140  Plaintiffs contended
that submarkets within the larger group licensing market exist, includ-
ing: (1) a submarket to use the group licenses in live game telecasts;
(2) a submarket for group licenses in videogames; and (3) a submarket
for group licenses “in game re-broadcasts, advertisements, and other
archival footage.”141  The court held that absent the challenged
NCAA rules, the student-athletes could create and sell group licenses
134. Id. at 965–66 (citation omitted).
135. Id.  Revenue from Division I football and basketball comes from a variety of sources:
“television networks, . . . ticket and merchandise sales, and . . . donations.”  Berry, supra note 50, R
at 805.  Schools often choose to put “this profit back into [their revenue-generating sports] . . . to
recruit the best high school athletes.” Id.  Coaches realize that recruiting the best athletes is
what makes their programs successful. Id. at 805–06.
136. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 966.
137. Id. at 967.
138. Id. at 968.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 968.
141. Id.
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in all of these submarkets because there was a demand to use student-
athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in each submarket.142
The court concluded that the NCAA had the power, and exercised
that power, to inhibit competition within the college education market
through price fixing.143  In exchange for the scholarship, the recruit
provided his athletic talent and granted the university and the NCAA
the ability to use the student-athlete’s name, image, and likeness.144
The schools created an impermissible anticompetitive effect by agree-
ing not to compete with one another and valuing the recruit’s name,
image, and likeness at zero.145  According to the court, the NCAA
engaged in a form of price-fixing by restraining the price competition
in the market for recruits’ athletic services and licensing rights.146  The
NCAA claimed that its student-athlete compensation restrictions
were reasonable because they necessarily upheld its tradition of ama-
teurism, maintained a competitive balance, promoted the integration
of academics and athletics, and increased the total output of its prod-
uct.147  In rejecting these justifications, the court found that the
NCAA’s goals could be achieved through less restrictive means.148
No credible evidence existed to prove that the popularity of college
sports would decrease or that the NCAA’s restrictions significantly
contributed to the popularity of the NCAA.149  Also, the rules had no
discernible effect on the level of competitive balance, and they did not
enhance academic outcomes for the students.150  In fact, the court
found that the demands of student-athletes’ athletic obligations pre-
vented many student-athletes from achieving meaningful academic
success.151
142. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 971.
143. Id. at 973.
144. Id.  “Student-athletes are required to sign several documents to participate in intercolle-
giate athletics, including Form 08-3a.”  Nolan, supra note 130, at 470.  Form 08-3a specifically R
states: “You authorize the NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host
institution, conference, local organizing committee)] to use your name or picture to generally
promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs.” NCAA, FORM
08-3A: STUDENT ATHLETE STATEMENT – DIVISION I 4 (2010–2011), http://www.liberty.edu/me-
dia/1912/compliance/newformsdec2010/currentflames/compliance/SA%20Statement%20Form
.pdf.
145. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
146. Id. at 972–73.
147. Id. at 973.
148. Id. at 982.
149. Id. at 977–78.
150. Id. at 978–80.
151. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp 3d at 981.  Sixty-nine percent of FBS football players graduated
from college in 2010.  Michael Marot, Graduation Rates for NCAA Athletes Improve, HUF-
FINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/27/graduation-rates-for-ncaa_n_774812.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld this decision, reiterating that
the NCAA is not above antitrust laws.152  The Ninth Circuit held that
the NCAA rules violated antitrust laws because they are more restric-
tive than necessary to maintain amateurism.153  Thus, the NCAA is
required to provide student-athletes with the full cost of attendance
but nothing more.154
E. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
and Other Policy Arguments
The contention that student-athletes should be compensated is well
supported by both law and public policy.  The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) was enacted by Congress “to pro-
tect employees from adverse employment [actions based on] age-
based stereotypes.”155  The ADEA protects any individual over the
age of forty.156  It also “broadly prohibits discrimination in . . . ‘hiring,
discharges, treatment during employment, advertising, and retalia-
tion.’”157  Student-athletes, and young people generally, are not
within the protected age group covered by the ADEA and are there-
fore left unprotected to any age-based stereotypes.  The theory of “re-
verse age discrimination” or discrimination against the young is not
protected under the ADEA but is a rapidly evolving area of law.158
The focus in this area of law is fairness; Congress enacted this legisla-
tion to protect workers against age discrimination and ensure that
workers are treated with fairness in the employment context.159
html (last updated May 25, 2011, 6:10 PM).  But, in men’s basketball, ten of the top twenty-five
teams’ graduation rates were 60% or lower according to NCAA calculations. Id.
152. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Ass’n, No. 14-16601, 2015 WL 5712106, at *26 (9th Cir.
Sept. 30, 2015).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Hartzler, supra note 11, at 218. R
156. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2012); Hartzler, supra note 11, at 218. R
157. Hartzler, supra note 11, at 224 (quoting H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Kendall L. Kelly, Price R
Waterhouse: Alive and Well Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 MERCER L.
REV. 721, 724, 726 (2000)). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 623 (laying out the prohibitions on em-
ployer practices).
158. Hartzler, supra note 11, at 219. R
159. The enforcement of the ADEA is through the FLSA, which ensures that the fair labor
standards of the work place are unaffected by age discrimination.  29 U.S.C. § 626(b); see also,
Ensuring Fairness for Older Workers: Hearing on S.1756 Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ.,
Labor, & Pensions, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Tom Harkin, Chairman).  The hearing
was convened to examine age discrimination against older workers to ensure that these workers
are “treated with the fairness they deserve.” Id. (statement of Tom Harkin, Chairman).
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III. ANALYSIS
The life-cycle model of career employment accurately depicts the
relationship between wages and age in the United States.160  Histori-
cally, the average amount of income earned over an employee’s work
life cycle increases with age.161  As an employee gets older, his or her
earnings increase and are not always a reflection of his or her produc-
tivity.162  The life-cycle model of career employment and earning ca-
pacity is in reverse for most athletes, both professional and otherwise.
Athletes are unique because their skill set is particularly lucrative at a
young age.163  While professional athletes are at the peak of their ca-
reer, they will frequently pursue long-term contracts to guarantee con-
tinued compensation in the event of an injury and as their skills
decline.164  As athletes get older, their skills deteriorate and are less
valuable to their respective job markets.165  It therefore follows that
student-athletes should be permitted to profit off of their unique skill
set in their youth.  Their careers in this job market are significantly
shorter than others, and student-athletes should earn a fair wage for
their performance in a profitable industry while their skill set is at a
heightened value and while they are subjected to significant physical
risk.
Additionally, student-athletes are uniquely vulnerable to reverse
age discrimination.166  Student-athletes ages eighteen through twenty-
three are not protected under the ADEA, but they are equally vulner-
able to age-based stereotypes.167  Student-athletes cannot be hired
into professional leagues until they are of a certain age—no matter
160. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 11, at 787. R
161. Id.
162. Id. at 787–88.
163. This is due to the young retirement age of athletes and the increased physical risk that
they endure. SCOTT TINLEY, RACING THE SUNSET: AN ATHLETE’S QUEST FOR LIFE AFTER
SPORT (2015).  Although some athletes may make more money as they get older (e.g. Michael
Jordan), this is not the case for most athletes; less than 2% of NCAA players move on to the
professional league even though they are participating in a lucrative league. E.g., J.G. Joakim
Soederbaum, Comment, Leveling the Playing Field—Balancing Student-Athletes’ Short- and
Long-Term Financial Interests with Educational Institutions’ Interests in Avoiding NCAA Sanc-
tions, 24 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 261, 274 (2013).
164. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 11, at 792 n.43. R
165. See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Ath-
lete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 76–78 (2006).
166. Reverse age discrimination is a theory asserting that when an employer gives preferential
treatment to an older person because of their age to the determinant of a younger worker,
discrimination has occurred.  Hartzler, supra note 11, at 229. R
167. In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
discrimination against the young is outside of the ADEA’s protection and the employer, there-
fore, did not violate the ADEA’s prohibition against discrimination because of age.  540 U.S.
581, 600 (2004).
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their athletic ability.168  They are forced to stay in the collegiate league
with no pay while they are essentially providing the same services to
an industry that does not recognize them as employees.  Like older
employees who are protected under the ADEA from age discrimina-
tion and unfair labor practices, student-athletes are equally vulnerable
and deserving of protection.  The principle of fairness as used in the
ADEA is equally applicable to young workers, and specifically, stu-
dent-athletes.  They should not suffer adverse employment conditions
because of their age.  Because they are driving the profits of a lucra-
tive industry, they should not be deprived of employee protections or
fair wages for their labor.
In this respect, the three models discussed in this Comment, the
NLRA and Northwestern University, the FLSA, and antitrust law as
used in O’Bannon, provide protection for student-athletes who re-
main uniquely vulnerable under the current laws.  This Comment pro-
poses that student-athletes should be compensated as employees.
This Part applies Northwestern University, the FLSA, and the
O’Bannon decision, as well as public policy, to support this contention
and argues that protection should be provided for student-athletes
who have a different life cycle of employment and are left unprotected
by the law.  Second, this Comment argues that universities and the
NCAA can compensate athletes without causing the downfall of the
NCAA.  To do this, student-athletes should keep their full grant-in-aid
scholarships, receive stipends to cover additional costs, and be paid
for the use of their images, names, and likenesses through a trust fund.
A. Student-Athletes Should Be Considered Employees
The recent challenges to the NCAA are not revolutionary, in fact,
student-athletes have sought better treatment and fair shares of reve-
nue for nearly a century.169  Two major cases, Northwestern University
168. The NFL requires an athlete to either be out of high school for three years or to have
finished at least three college football seasons before they are eligible for the draft.
Soederbaum, supra note 163, at 269.  The NBA requires that the player be nineteen years old R
and at least one year out of high school. Id.  at 270.
169. William B. Gould IV et al., Full Court Press: Northwestern University, a New Challenge
to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 2 n.1 (2014) (citing Nicholas Fram & T. Ward
Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60
BUFF. L. REV. 1003, 1005–06 (2012)).
In 1936, . . . the Howard University football team struck for several games, demanding
adequate medical supplies for players, nutritional food and access to campus jobs.  Two
years later, the Louisiana State University football team dismissed a player after ‘he
dared to ‘agitate a union’ of players.’ . . .  After an undefeated 1937 season garnered the
squad a Rose Bowl invitation, [University of Pittsburgh football] players demanded
$200 in pocket money for their participation.  When university officials balked, the
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and O’Bannon, give rise to significant alterations to the NCAA model
and serve as important precedent for other college athletes seeking
the same rights.170  There is ample support within the law and public
policy to establish that student-athletes are employees, and, thus, eligi-
ble for collective bargaining rights and additional monetary
compensation.
1. Northwestern University Precedent and the NLRA Lend
Support To Establish That Student-Athletes Are Employees
Using Northwestern University and the NLRA, student-athletes
could persuasively argue that they are employees and deserve com-
pensation.  Football players at Northwestern University successfully
petitioned for a union representation election in front of NLRB Re-
gional Director, Peter Sung Ohr.171  The student-athletes argued that
they are employees of the university and are entitled to collective bar-
gaining rights and other protections under the NLRA.172  Section 2(3)
of the Act states that the term employee includes “any employee.”173
Following U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Board applied the com-
mon law definition of employee to decide that the Northwestern
grant-in-aid scholarship players were employees under Section 2(3).174
“[A]n employee is a person who performs services for another
under a contract of hire, subject to the others’ control or right of con-
trol, and in return for payment.”175  Thus, looking at the common law
definition, all student-athletes subjected to programs like Northwest-
ern’s football program should be considered employees.  All student-
athletes, particularly those in revenue-generating sports,176 perform
players voted 17-16 to boycott the game . . . The thirty-odd members of the freshman
squad threatened to strike again several months later.  Their demands included four-
year athletic scholarships, shorter working hours, accommodation for class time missed
due to football obligations, and collective bargaining rights.
Id. (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Fram & Frampton, supra note 169, at 1005–06).
170. Northwestern University directed the Northwestern football team to hold an election to
vote whether the players desired to be “represented for collective bargaining purposes by Col-
lege Athletes Players Association (CAPA).”  NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 23. R
Student-athletes at other institutions who wish to be represented by a union would similarly
have to file a petition under the NLRA.  Arguably, the O’Bannon decision is more far-reaching
and will affect all student-athletes under the NCAA.
171. Id. at 23–24.
172. Id. at 2.
173. Id. at 13 (second alteration in original).
174. Id. (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)).
175. Id. (citing Brown Univ., 342 NLRB 483, 490 N.24 (2004)).
176. Examples of revenue-generating sports programs include men’s Division I Football and
Basketball.
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services for their universities who profit substantially.177  To offer
these services, student-athletes dedicate a significant amount of time.
In a 2011 self-reported survey conducted by the NCAA, Division I
men’s FBS football and basketball players reported spending on aver-
age between 39.2–43.3 hours on athletic activities.178  The average
hours spent per week on academia was 37.3–38.0, indicating that stu-
dent-athletes dedicate more time to their athletic programs and are
therefore primarily athletes rather than students.179
The NLRB in Northwestern University analogized the tender offer
with a contract for hire.180  The tender provides information to players
regarding the duration and conditions under which they remain in the
program and receive their scholarship181 thus resembling an employ-
ment contract.182  This tender is a common form of agreement for ath-
letes wishing to play collegiate sports.183  Additionally, due to athletic
scholarship, courts and scholars already “overwhelmingly recognize
the contractual nature of the relationship between student-athletes
and their institutions.”184  The university makes an offer to pay for the
student-athletes’ academic expenses.185  The student-athletes, by ac-
cepting the university’s offer, promise to provide the university and
the NCAA with their athletic performance for a fixed duration.186
The student-athletes sign the tender offer, which evidences each “par-
ties’ intent to be bound.”187  Finally, the monetary value of the schol-
arship and the student-athletes’ promise to attend only one university
177. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
178. NCAA SAN ANTONIO CONVENTION, Examining the Student-Athlete Experience Through
the NCAA GOALS and SCORE Studies, PowerPoint Slides 17 (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.ncaa
.org/sites/default/files/Goals10_score96_final_convention2011_public_version_01_13_11.pdf.
179. Id. at 18.
180. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 14. R
181. Id.
182. The elements of a contract include: an offer, acceptance, consideration, and the parties’
intent to be bound.  Esquire, Contracts Outline: The UCC and Restatement Second of Contracts
(1L), LEGAL THREE (Oct. 22, 2013), http://legalthree.com/legal-news/contract-generally-the-ucc-
and-restatement-second-of-contracts-1l/.
183. “In the NCAA, the National Letter of Intent (NLI) accompanied by a scholarship agree-
ment constitute[ ] the written contract a . . . student-athlete must sign in order to solidify his or
her commitment to a particular institution.”  M. Alexander Russell, Leveling the Playing Field:
Identifying a Quasi-Fiduciary Relationship Between Coaches and Student-Athletes, 43 J.L. &
EDUC. 289, 292 (2014).
184. Louis Hakim, The Student-Athlete vs. the Athlete Student: Has the Time Arrived for an
Extended-Term Scholarship Contract, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 145, 169 (2000).
185. Id. at 169–70.
186. Id. at 170.
187. Id.
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shows valuable consideration and demonstrates all elements of a
contract.188
The relationship between student-athletes and their universities fur-
ther resembles an employment relationship because the head coach
maintains the ability to reduce or cancel student-athlete scholarships
for various reasons.189  Because this action can take place immediately
and under a variety of circumstances, the Board in Northwestern Uni-
versity found that these scholarships were connected to the perform-
ance of athletic services.190  These scholarships “can be . . . canceled if
the player voluntarily withdraws or abuses the team rules.”191  The
NCAA currently prohibits players from receiving compensation or
any profit derived from their athletic ability or reputation, making
them reliant on their scholarships for income.192
Division 1 student-athletes are subject to an extreme amount of
control.  The NCAA limits players’ athletically-related activities to
twenty hours per week during the academic year193 so that student-
athletes can be both students and athletes.194  The schools, however,
find clever ways to surpass this hour requirement.195  The NCAA does
not count certain activities “such as travel, mandatory training meet-
ings, voluntary weight conditioning or strength training, medical
check-ins, [and] training tape review” toward the CARA total.196  Ad-
ditionally, players must follow the rules of their program or face
threat of discipline or loss of their scholarship.197  The universities
control their players’ living arrangements, ability to apply for outside
employment, off-campus travel, Internet posts, media access, and
other activities.198  Universities also have considerable control over
the student-athletes’ academic education.199  Often times, players are
unable to enlist in certain classes if they conflict with practice or travel
188. See id.
189. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 15. R
190. The scholarship cannot be reduced on the basis of injury. Id. at 4 n.8.  “If a player has a
career ending injury, they are deemed a ‘medical non-counter,’” meaning “that their football
scholarship does not count against the NCAA’s scholarship limit.” Id. See generally NCAA,
supra note 22, at 195 (outlining the rule on retroactive financial aid). R
191. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 15. See generally NCAA, supra note 22, at R
196 (outlining the rule on reduction and cancellation).
192. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 14. See generally NCAA, supra note 22, at R
67 (outlining the rule on compensation for student-athletes).
193. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 6 n.11. R
194. NCAA, supra note 22, 4 (Article 2.9). R
195. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 15–16. R
196. Id. at 6 n.11.
197. Id. at 15.
198. Supra note 91 and accompanying text.
199. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 16. R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL108.txt unknown Seq: 23 18-JAN-16 12:25
2015] THE NCAA IS DROPPING THE BALL 193
for away games.200  Athletes are subject to a minimum grade point
average by their universities and must make certain progress toward
obtaining their degree in addition to their athletic duties.201
The Northwestern athletes successfully used their grant-in-aid
scholarships as evidence of payment,202 a practice that can be used for
all athletes playing revenue-generating sports and who are seeking
employee status.  This valuable grant-in-aid scholarship, which Divi-
sion I FBS football and basketball players receive, is directly tied to
the student-athletes’ athletic ability and serves as payment for their
performance.
Northwestern University relied on Brown University to argue that
student-athletes are not employees and are more akin to graduate stu-
dents.203  This argument was not convincing to the Board and can be
rebutted in future litigation.  The Board reasoned that the student-
athletes’ duties are “unrelated to their academic studies unlike the
graduate assistants whose teaching and research duties [are] inextrica-
bly related to their graduate degree requirements.”204  Student-ath-
letes’ athletic related activities do not further their education; in fact,
their dedication to athletics may work to their education’s detriment
and often does.205  Also, unlike the graduate students who are work-
ing toward their professions, the majority of athletes never have the
opportunity to play professionally.206  Often times, a student-athlete’s
superior athletic skills and ability to perform are a means to pay for
college and further their education in a different field.207
200. Id.
201. Id. at 17; Vine, supra note 41, at 249. See generally NCAA, supra note 22, at 153 (outlin- R
ing the rules for qualifiers).
202. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 14. R
203. Id. at 18.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 981 (N.D. Cal.
2014).  However, this is not the case for Northwestern University.  “[T]he players have a cumula-
tive grade point average of 3.024 and a 97% graduation rate.”  NLRB, Northwestern Univ.,
supra note 3, at 13.  Their Academic Progress Rate (APR), which refers to a universities reten- R
tion of its student-athletes and player eligibility, is 996 out of 1000. Id. at 13, 13 n.28.  “The
players’ graduation rate and their APR both rank first in the country among football teams.” Id.
at 13.  Other universities have a significantly lower graduation rate. E.g., Soederbaum, supra
note 163, at 274. R
206. “[L]ess than 2% of NCAA football and basketball players actually make it from NCAA
to professional sports.”  Soederbaum, supra note 163, at 274. R
207. Some Northwestern Players have plans to go on to “medical school, law school, and
careers in the engineering field after receiving their . . . degree.”  NLRB, Northwestern Univ.,
supra note 3, at 13. R
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The Northwestern University decision has been attacked by the
press,208 Congress,209 and nonathlete students;210 however, others
have celebrated this decision.211  Northwestern University appealed to
the NLRB in Washington, D.C.,212 and on August 17, 2015, the NLRB
decided to unanimously decline jurisdiction.213  Most importantly on
appeal, the NLRB did not decide whether student-athletes are consid-
ered employees.214  The Board did not preclude reconsidering the is-
sue of student-athletes’ employee status in the future,215 and it is likely
that it will soon be confronted with this issue again.216
The Board declined jurisdiction in part because of its concern with
the promotion of labor stability.217  There are roughly 125 collegiate
institutions with FBS football programs, seventeen of which are pri-
vate institutions.218  As the Board observed, it does not have jurisdic-
208. See, e.g., Douglas Belkin et al., Northwestern Football Players Get Approval to Unionize,
WALL STREET  J., Mar. 26, 2014, http://wsj.com/articles/; Patrick T. Harker, Opinion, Student
Athletes Shouldn’t Unionize, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/opin-
ion/student-athletes-shouldnt-unionize.html?_r=1.
209. See, e.g., Press Release, Committee Examine Troubling Consequences of Unionizing Stu-
dent Athletes, EDUC. & WORKFORCE (May 8, 2014), http://edworkforce.house.gov/news/docu-
mentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=379328 (quoting Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the
Consequences of Unionizing Student Athletes: Hearing Before the H. Educ. & Workforce Comm.,
113th Cong. 2014 (statement of Rep. John Kline, Chairman, H. Educ. & Workforce Comm.).
Today’s witnesses confirmed classifying student athletes as school ‘employees’ will hurt
their athletic and academic careers. . . .  There is no question the legitimate concerns of
student athletes must be addressed, but doing so at the collective bargaining table will
do more harm than good.  It’s encouraging to hear from institutions with policies in
place that put student athletes first, such as providing continued academic support to
students who sustain a sports injury.  We need all institutions to step up and follow suit.
Instead of treating student athletes as something they are not, let’s help ensure the real
challenges they face are resolved.
Id. (quoting Rep. John Kline).
210. See, e.g., Katie Lobosco, Students Cry Foul over Athletes Unions, CNN MONEY (Apr. 23,
2014, 6:15 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/23/pf/college/student-athlete-union-survey/.
211. See, e.g., Marc Edelman, 21 Reasons Why Student-Athletes Are Employees and Should Be
Allowed to Unionize, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2014, 10:11AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedel
man/2014/01/30/21-reasons-why-student-athletes-are-employees-and-should-be-allowed-to-
unionize/.
212. Alan K. Cubbage, Statement by Alan K. Cubbage, Vice President for University Relations,
in Regard to Decision by NLRB Regional Director, NW. U. NEWS (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www
.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2014/03/statement-by-alan-k.-cubbage,-vice-president-for-
university-relations,-in-regard-to-decision-by-nlrb-regional-director.html.
213. NLRB, Northwestern Univ. Appeal, supra note 7, at 7. R
214. Id. at 1.
215. Id.
216. See Dave Zirin, The Absurd, Cowardly, and Morally Bankrupt NLRB Decision Against
the Northwestern Football Union, NATION (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/the-
absurd-cowardly-and-morally-bankrupt-nlrb-decision-against-the-northwestern-football-union/.
217. NLRB, Northwestern Univ. Appeal, supra note 7, at 1. R
218. Id. at 5.
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tion over a majority of the FBS teams because these schools are not
considered employers under Section 2(2) of the Act (most of them are
public institutions).219  According to the Board, making a decision re-
garding Northwestern would promote instability in labor relations.220
However, student-athletes at state-run institutions can gain employee
status and unionize under state labor laws, just as the private institu-
tions can under the NLRA.221  Although some states have legislation
against unionizing, or against considering student-athletes as employ-
ees,222 these laws may be challenged.  Student-athletes should be con-
sidered employees, and a law depriving employees of wages should
not stand.223  Each team that participates in Division I athletics is
unique, and student-athletes at each university may have particular
grievances that they wish to address.  The ability to do so is available
under current state and federal law, and thus, the stability of labor
relations within the NCAA is unaffected.
The Northwestern University Board left open the possibility for
unionization in the future, and because state law mimics NLRA regu-
lations pertaining to employee status,224 student-athletes at both
private and public institutions may petition to be considered employ-
ees and able to unionize.  The ability to collectively bargain is a start;
student-athletes will have certain rights previously not afforded to
them, such as the ability to bargain for wages, health coverage, and
receive protection from other laws including antidiscrimination stat-
utes and workers’ compensation statutes.  Ultimately, the NCAA
needs to make changes for student-athletes to improve their status
and obtain additional compensation.
Although the Board’s recent decision is not precisely a win for stu-
dent-athletes, Northwestern University exposed the strenuous athletic
programs of Division I schools and the amount of control that stu-
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1; Zirin, supra note 216. R
222. NLRB, Northwestern Univ. Appeal, supra note 7, at 5, 5 nn.18–19 (“WIS. STAT. R
§ 111.91(3)(a) (limiting public sector union collective bargaining to ‘total base wages’); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-98 (declaring public sector collective bargaining illegal and unlawful)[;]
. . . OHIO REV. CODE SEC. 3345.56; MICH. COMP. LAWS. SEC. 423.201(1)(e)(iii) (covering Big Ten
members Ohio State University, University of Michigan, and Michigan State University).  Both
states were enacted after [the Northwestern] petition . . . was filed.”).
223. A law depriving an employee of wages could be challenged in numerous ways under state
and federal law and possibly under the Thirteenth Amendment. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII § 1 (prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude).
224. See generally Collective Bargaining and Labor Arbitration: An Overview, LEGAL INFOR-
MATIONAL INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/collective_bargaining.html (last visited Aug.
23, 2015) (discussing how collective bargaining is governed by both federal and state statutory
laws).
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dent-athletes are subjected to, despite the amateurism these schools
purportedly stand for.  As Kain Colter stated: “It’s definitely not a
loss . . . .  Since we started this movement, a lot of positive changes
have come from this . . . . A lot of the things that we’ve been fighting
for have been adopted.  But there is still a lot of room to go.”225  It is
obvious that student-athletes want to voice their concerns to those in
control of their working conditions, and they should have the right to
do so, “even if recognition of that right is inconvenient for, or philo-
sophically disagreeable to, or adverse to the economic interests of
their employer.”226
2. The Relationship Between Student-Athletes, Universities, and the
NCAA Does Not Satisfy the DOL’s Internship Exception
The Department of Labor’s six-factor test for determining whether
an unpaid intern is entitled to minimum wage can be used to show
that student-athletes are employees and entitled to compensation.227
This test regulates unpaid internships for services rendered by college
students to for-profit employers.228  Under the test, the internship
must meet all six-factors articulated by the Department of Labor to be
considered an internship.229  If the position is an internship, the em-
ployer is not subjected to minimum wage and overtime provisions.230
However, if one or more of these factors is not met, then the individ-
ual is considered an employee and is entitled to compensation.231
When scrutinized under this test, collegiate institutions cannot meet
the fourth factor: “the employer that provides the training derives no
immediate advantage from the activities of the intern.”232  Because
the institutions do profit substantially from the activities of college
225. Tom Farrey, Northwestern Players Denied Request To Form First Union for Athletes,
ESPN (Aug. 17, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/13455477/nlrb-says-north-
western-players-cannot-unionize.
226. Id. (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n at 2, NLRB, North-
western Univ., supra note 3 (No. 13-RC-121359)). R
227. Michael H. LeRoy, An Invisible Union for an Invisible Labor Market: College Football
and the Union Substitution Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1077, 1096 (2012); M. Tyler Brown, Com-
ment, College Athletics Internships: The Case for Academic Credit in College Athletics, 63 AM. U.
L. REV. 1855, 1874–91 (2014); see Keith L. Hammond, Former Soccer Player Seeks Minimum
Wage for Student-Athletes, Sues NCAA, 352 Division I Schools, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 30, 2014), http:/
/www.lexology.com/ (search “Keith L. Hammond”; then follow “Keith L. Hammond” hyperlink
under Results; then follow “Former Soccer Player Seeks Minimum Wage for Student-Athletes,
Sues NCAA, 352 Division I Schools” hyperlink).
228. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 115. R
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. Id.
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athletes, these athletes should be considered employees under the
FLSA and entitled to compensation.
Here, the FLSA is applicable to student-athletes because these stu-
dents provide a service to their universities and the NCAA, and those
institutions and organizations profit significantly off of those ser-
vices.233  The FLSA is useful in this context because it makes students’
work compensable regardless of their status as students.234  This is
particularly persuasive in combating the NCAA’s amateurism defense
where it claims that student-athletes cannot be both students and
workers.235 In fact, this exception was made for the very purpose of
countering that argument.236  Further, arguing that the FLSA is not
applicable would lead to absurdities, such as other student workers237
not being eligible for compensation.  This would be inconsistent with
the DOL’s purpose in regulating student workers and making sure
that they get payment where payment is due.238
Under the FLSA, “employ” is defined as “to suffer or permit to
work.”239  College sports fall under this definition and can be inter-
preted under this test because they are structured like professional
league apprenticeships.240  NCAA football provides the equivalent of
an unpaid internship because the NFL has no minor league system.241
“The NFL requires an athlete to be either out of high school for three
years or to have finished at least three college football seasons” before
they are eligible for the draft.242  While the NBA only requires that its
players “be at least nineteen-years-old and to be at least one year” out
of high school before being drafted, the NBA primarily recruits from
the NCAA.243  Both football and basketball programs may be scruti-
nized under this test because the revenues that schools bring in from
233. Student-athletes dedicate a substantial amount of time in their athletic programs, which
contributes to the profitability of their program. See supra notes 44–49, 177–85, and accompany- R
ing text.
234. Bacon, supra note 115, at 68. R
235. See NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 2, 18; see also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Col- R
legiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 974–75, 979–980, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
236. “By issuing Fact Sheet #71, the Obama administration suggests that it intends to hold for-
profit firms to the DOL’s guidelines more strictly than in the past.”  Bacon, supra note 115, at 68. R
237. For purposes of this Comment, “student workers” include research assistants and other
students who work on campus or for the university.
238. Id. at 70–71.
239. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2012).
240. LeRoy, supra note 227, at 1096.  LeRoy’s article only analyzes FBS football and not R
college basketball.  This Comment proposes that like college football, college basketball can be
considered an apprenticeship because there is no minor league.
241. Id. The same applies to NCAA basketball and the NBA.
242. Soederbaum, supra note 163, at 269. R
243. Id. at 270.
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their athletic programs is greater than the cost of those programs,
which results in huge profits.244
When applying the six factor test to the football program at North-
western, which resembles the Division I athletic programs across the
country, the NCAA and membership institutions would have a diffi-
cult time satisfying this test, particularly the fourth factor: “[t]he em-
ployer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage
from the activities of the intern; . . . .”245  The Northwestern football
program generated approximately $235 million in revenue from
2003–2012.246  Both the NCAA and membership institutions receive
significant benefits from the activities of their revenue-generating ath-
letes.247  Often times, as demonstrated in Northwestern University,
membership institutions are able to use the revenue generated from
their athletic program in any way they please.248  Because the univer-
sities would not satisfy this test, student-athletes would be entitled to
compensation.
Using the FLSA is beneficial for student-athletes because it applies
to all colleges and universities—both private and public.249  Although,
the FLSA’s internship regulation does not apply to educational intern-
ships wherein students receive academic credit,250 this is inconsequen-
tial.  Student-athletes do not receive academic credit for their
participation in athletics, which resembles an unpaid internship,251
meaning that this test may be applied to student-athletes.
3. O’Bannon Supports the Contention that Student-Athletes Should
Be Compensated
The licensing issues raised in O’Bannon, as well as in other con-
texts,252 are directly intertwined with the issues of whether student-
athletes should receive compensation. O’Bannon makes clear that
244. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
245. Id.
246. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 14. R
247. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
248. NLRB, Northwestern Univ., supra note 3, at 14. R
249. LeRoy, supra note 227, at 1096. R
250. Id. at 1096–97.
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Edward H. Grimmett, Comment, NCAA Amateurism and Athletics: A Perfect
Marriage or a Dysfunctional Relationship?—An Antitrust Approach to Student-Athlete Compen-
sation, 30 TOURO L. REV. 823, 823 (2014).  “Johnny Manziel, a [NCAA] Heisman Trophy win-
ner[,] . . . allegedly received improper benefits in exchange for his autograph and was
[consequently] suspended for the first half of Texas A&M’s season opener for an ‘inadvertent
violation of NCAA rules.’” Id. (quoting Tom Fornelli, Jonny Manziel Suspended for First Half
of Rice Game, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 28, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/\collegefootball/
eye-on-college-football/23366173/johnny-manziel-suspended-for-first-half-of-rice-game).
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student-athletes should be compensated because the NCAA, its mem-
ber institutions, and its licensing affiliate (The Collegiate Licensing
Company) generate billions of dollars through television revenue and
profit substantially from the names and images of student-athletes.253
In comparison, student-athletes only receive grant-in-aid scholarships
for their role in the college sports market.254  The court in O’Bannon
held that the rules prohibiting player compensation for use of players’
names, images, and likenesses unreasonably restrained trade.255  The
NCAA is now forced to develop a way to compensate players for the
use of their names, images, and likenesses, or at least find a less re-
strictive means.256  The O’Bannon decision is useful because it aids
student-athletes in receiving more compensation; however, there are
still other issues to consider.  As Judge Wilkin stated in her opinion,
the challenged restraints and other inequalities in collegiate athletics
and higher education “could be better addressed as a policy matter by
reforms other than those available as a remedy for the antitrust viola-
tion found here.  Such reforms and remedies could be undertaken by
the NCAA, its member schools and conferences, or Congress.”257
Although O’Bannon provides authority for athletes to receive com-
pensation, it does not fully resolve the issues surrounding the relation-
ship between student-athletes, membership institutions, and the
NCAA.  If student-athletes are able to show that they are employees
of their institutions through the NLRA model used in Northwestern
University or through the FLSA, student-athletes will be able to gain
additional compensation and other employment rights that will help
resolve their grievances.
4. Public Policy Supports the Contention that Student-Athletes Are
Employees and Should Be Compensated
The status quo of collegiate sports has been heavily criticized.258
The New York Times commented on university spending under the
NCAA’s old rules, which allowed for heavy spending on the best ath-
253. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 993–94 (N.D. Cal. 2014),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-16601, 2015
WL 5712106 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015); Grimmett, supra note 252, at 823. R
254. Grimmett, supra note 252, at 823–24.
255. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007.
256. Id. at 1007–08.
257. Id. at 1009.
258. See, e.g., Players: 0; Colleges: $10,000,000,000, ECONOMIST (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www
.economist.com/news/united-states/21612160-pressure-grows-let-student-athletes-share-fruits-
their-own-labours-players-0 (“For decades, . . . the best coaches earn millions of dollars while the
best players live hand to mouth . . . for colleges to make millions from the unpaid labour of
mostly black athletes carried ‘the whiff of the plantation.’” (quoting Taylor Branch, The Shame
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letic coaches and extravagant facilities.259  The head football coach at
Alabama makes $6.9 million a year, while his offensive coordinator
earns $680,000 and his defensive coordinator earns $1.35 million.260
The football team at Ohio State has a 10,000 square foot locker room,
which is worth $2.5 million.261  In addition, conferences may receive
money if one of their teams qualifies for the Bowl Championship Se-
ries; last year, Florida State and Auburn earned $18 million for each
of their conferences.262  These lucrative athletic programs have be-
come central to these schools and their ability to function as higher-
education institutions.
Knowing this, we must ask: Is the relationship between student-ath-
letes and their membership institutions fair and just?  To many people,
the current arrangement between student-athletes, their universities,
and the NCAA seems like a fair deal.263  Universities offer full schol-
arships to students-athletes while many other nonathlete students
struggle to pay for college.264  However, those who make this argu-
ment fail to realize the true underpinnings of the relationship between
student-athletes, their universities, and the NCAA; it is significantly
different from the relationship other students have with their
university.
Student-athletes cannot gain professional experience without com-
promising their scholarships and playing eligibility.265  Article 12.4 of
the NCAA bylaws permits student athletes to obtain employment but
limits compensation to “work actually performed” and “at a rate com-
mensurate with the going rate in that locality for similar services.”266
Other nonathlete students do not face these same employment restric-
tions.267  Nonathlete students are free to intern with firms in their field
of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/archive/2011/10/the-shame-
of-college-sports/308643/)).
259. Steve Eder, Fears Rise over Wealth Gap as Top College Conferences Push Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/sports/ncaafootball/new-rules-would-
further-separate-college-sports-haves-from-have-nots.html?_r=1.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See, e.g., Kieran McCauley, College Athletes Shouldn’t Be Paid, DAILY LOCAL (Apr. 28,
2015), http://www.dailylocal.com/sports/20150428/college-athletes-shouldnt-be-paid (stating
“athletic scholarships are their compensation and a fair one at that”); Players: 0; Colleges:
$10,000,000,000, supra note 258. R
264. See, e.g., Players: 0; Colleges: $10,000,000,000, supra note 258. R
265. Jeffrey Standen, The Next Labor Market in College Sports, 92 OR. L. REV. 1093, 1111
(2014).
266. NCAA, supra note 22, at 67. R
267. Gregory Sconzo, Comment, They’re Not Yours, They Are My Own: How NCAA Em-
ployment Restrictions Violate Antitrust Law, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 746 (2013).
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or profession without penalty or reprisal, but student-athletes are re-
stricted in many respects.268  Unlike many other students, student-ath-
letes “lack professional experience and have comparatively little
knowledge about their chosen fields . . . upon graduation.”269  For ex-
ample, Jon Gissinger, former tight-end and a graduate from the Uni-
versity of Missouri, stated: “A football player is not going to get a job
over someone who worked and had internships . . . .  My re´sume´ right
now is football.”270
Moreover, student-athletes participating in college basketball and
football, “identify . . . more strongly as athletes than as students . . .
[and give] more weight in choosing [a] college to athletics than to aca-
demics.”271  After all, the time student-athletes dedicate to their ath-
letic programs takes away from the time dedicated to academics.272
Consequently, there have been many instances of academic fraud.273
“In 2011, the graduation rates (given six years to complete the degree)
for football and basketball players were 16% and 25% below the col-
lege average, respectively.”274  Because of the rigorous efforts players
put into their athletic goals, they graduate or simply leave the univer-
sity with a subpar academic foundation.275  The current arrangement
adversely affects a majority of student-athletes who do not pursue ca-
reers in professional sports.276
268. Id.
269. Soederbaum, supra note 163, at 275–76. R
270. Stephanie Stark, College Athletes Suffer the Greatest Injustice from NCAA, USA TODAY:
C. (Aug. 28, 2011, 4:01 PM), http://college.usatoday.com/2011/08/28/college-athletes-suffer-the-
greatest-injustice-from-ncaa/.
271. Soederbaum, supra note 163, at 274 (second, third, and fourth alteration in original) R
(footnote omitted) (quoting Gary Gutting, Opinion, The Myth of the ‘Student-Athlete’, N.Y.
TIMES: BLOG (Mar. 15, 2012, 8:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/the-
myth-of-the-student-athlete/?_r=0).
272. See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text.
273. Players: 0; Colleges: $10,000,000,000, supra note 258.  “[A]n investigation into the Univer- R
sity of North Carolina found that athletes were often enrolled in ‘no show classes.’” Id.  Only
“44% of men’s basketball players graduate within six years” from the average member school in
the NCAA’s five highest-grossing conferences. Id.; see also Vine, supra note 43, at 259.
To enable student-athletes to devote the maximum time to their respective schools,
schools have created specialized academic curricula for them, consisting of undemand-
ing courses and sometimes of questionable practicable value.  Kevin Ross, a former
Creighton basketball player, complained . . . that he never learned to read in four years
at Creighton University. . . .  Football players at Ohio State University were able to
retake head coach Jim Tressel’s ‘Varsity Football 101’ class up to five times for a total of
ten credits.
Vine, supra note 41, at 259 (footnotes omitted).
274. Soederbaum, supra note 163, at 274 (footnote omitted). R
275. See id. at 275.
276. See id. at 275–76.
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College is a “necessary piece of the professional athletics puzzle[,]”
but “less than 2% of NCAA football and basketball players actually
make it from NCAA to professional sports.”277  Despite this, it is ben-
eficial for the student-athlete to play college sports to gain exposure
and earn a degree, even if it is just a partial degree.278  The athletes
that do play professionally often face short-term and insecure con-
tracts.279  They run the risk of being released for injury or nonper-
formance.280  A degree gives student-athletes a back-up plan in case
their professional career is cut short.  With the student-athletes’
unique life cycle of employment, it is only fair that they be compen-
sated for the labor they provide to their universities and the NCAA
while they are physically able to do so.281
College sports are an independent enterprise that is both a popular
and lucrative form of entertainment in the United States.282  Student-
athletes are stars that are “watched and cheered on by millions.”283
Within Johnny Manziel’s284 first year of playing Division I football for
Texas A&M, he generated $37 million in media exposure; he was not
entitled to any of this profit.285  The NCAA acquired its own fan base
without having to compete with the NFL.286  The March Madness col-
lege basketball tournament generated $1.15 billion in advertising reve-
nue in 2013287 and “sends workplaces across the [United States] into a
frenzy with small-time betting” each year.288  College athletics gener-
ate $10.5 billion a year from television contracts, exceeding the
amount that the NFL generates.  Of that amount, less than 30% goes
toward student-athletes’ scholarships and financial aid.289  Contrarily,
277. Id. at 274.
278. Standen, supra note 265, at 1107–08. R
279. Leslie E. Wong, Comment, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O’Bannon Takes on
the NCAA for Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 1069, 1106 (2010).
280. Id.
281. See supra notes 160–68 and accompanying text. R
282. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
283. Players: 0; Colleges: $10,000,000,000, supra note 258. R
284. Also known as “Johnny Football,” he was the first freshman Heisman Trophy winner in
2012.  Soederbaum, supra note 163, at 261. R
285. Id. at 261.
286. See Players: 0; Colleges: $10,000,000,000, supra note 258. College football games are usu- R
ally scheduled on Saturdays and the professionals typically play on Sundays.
287. Tom Van Riper, March Madness Ratings and Revenue Keep Reaching New Heights,
FORBES (Mar. 20, 2014, 10:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvanriper/2014/03/20/march-
madness-ratings-and-revenue-keep-reaching-new-heights/.
288. Players: 0; Colleges: $10,000,000,000, supra note 258. R
289. Id.
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athletes playing professionally receive around one-half of their respec-
tive leagues’ turnover in salary and benefits.290
Student-athletes should be considered employees and should re-
ceive additional compensation.  The relationship with their universi-
ties and with the NCAA is unique as compared to nonathlete
students.291  Student-athletes’ relationship with the NCAA more
closely resembles the relationship between professional athletes and
the professional leagues.292  To the extent that they are similarly situ-
ated, the NCAA, in effect, engages in a form of age discrimination
and violates the underlying purpose of the ADEA.293  Furthermore, a
majority of student-athletes’ time is spent on athletically related activ-
ities at the expense of their education.294  Many student-athletes will
rely on their education for their livelihood, yet they are unable to fully
excel academically because they are busy generating millions of dol-
lars for universities without receiving a fair portion of what they earn.
Public policy demands that student-athletes be given employee status
and receive additional compensation for equitable purposes.
B. Proposal for how Employment Rights, Including Compensation,
May Be Implemented
The NCAA was established to protect student-athletes.295  How-
ever, with the upsurge of media exposure, it is becoming increasingly
difficult for the NCAA to figure out how to proceed in protecting and
monitoring student-athletes.296  This Comment proposes that student-
athletes should keep their full grant-in-aid scholarships, receive sti-
pends to cover additional costs, and be paid for the use of their names,
images, and likenesses through a trust fund (distinguishable from the
one suggested in O’Bannon).  Additionally, the NCAA should revise
its rules to create a more compatible relationship between the stu-
dent-athletes and the NCAA.
Student-athletes are currently compensated through full grant-in-
aid scholarships.297  The market value of a college athlete’s scholar-
290. Id.
291. See supra notes 271–78 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 279–89 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text.
295. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2014),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-16601, 2015
WL 5712106 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015); Vine, supra note 41, at 23. R
296. Sconzo, supra note 267, at 762 (noting that the NCAA will still serve an important pur- R
pose in monitoring the student-athletes in the employment context.).
297. Standen, supra note 265, at 1106. R
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ship is around “$200,000 over a college career, all tax-free.”298  Signifi-
cantly, even if student-athletes were considered employees, their
athletic scholarships would still not be taxed.299  When compared to
the compensation paid to other eighteen to twenty-three year olds,
this appears to be a good deal.300  The next best job opportunity
would be a minimum wage job right out of high school.301  In addition
to a free education, student-athletes have an opportunity to obtain a
college degree.302  This may “translate[ ] into a lifetime of superior
earnings.”303
There is no doubt that the current compensation student-athletes
receive has value.  Scholarships are “an ideal form of compensation
for [both] the school” and the student.304  For the school, the cost of
offering a scholarship is market value and marginal compared to the
benefits the school receives from the student-athletes.305  For the stu-
dent-athlete, this is a tax-free, valuable education.306  Student-athletes
also receive access to athletic opportunities that they would not other-
wise enjoy.307  For some athletes with average grades who are not
drafted to play professionally, their degree represents a significant en-
hancement to their expected earnings.308  For the lucky few athletes,
the opportunity to play college sports exposes them to the profes-
sional league and offers them a chance to be drafted once they qual-
ify.309  Therefore, student-athletes should continue to receive an
education while being compensated through their scholarship.
However, the full cost of attendance is not covered by the scholar-
ships.310  Student-athletes are prohibited by NCAA regulations from
receiving any outside compensation.311  Even if student-athletes were
not prohibited from holding jobs elsewhere, working part-time cannot
cover their additional living expenses beyond what is covered by
scholarship because of the significant time commitment these student
298. Id. at 1106–07 (footnote omitted).
299. This issue was raised in the Northwestern litigation.  Farrey, supra note 225.  In a letter to R
Senator Richard Burr, “the IRS clarified that its code allows for the exclusion of tuition, fees,
books, supplies and equipment required” for instruction. Id.
300. See Standen, supra note 265 at 1107.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1116.
305. Id.
306. Standen, supra note 265, at 1107; see Farrey, supra note 225. R
307. Standen, supra note 265, at 1106–07. R
308. Id. at 1107.
309. Id. at 1107–08.
310. Id. at 1108.
311. NCAA, supra note 22, at 67. R
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athletes give to sports and academics.312  Student-athletes should re-
ceive extra compensation in the form of a stipend to cover the true
cost of attendance that is not currently covered by the full grant-in-aid
scholarship.313  In January 2015, the NCAA’s five wealthiest confer-
ences agreed to increase the value of athletic scholarships to be more
reflective of the true cost of attendance, meaning student-athletes may
receive stipends.314  This practice will not violate any current NCAA
“pay for play” restrictions because the money will be used for student-
athletes’ academic education and will not exceed the cost of
attendance.315
In addition to cost of attendance, student-athletes should also be
compensated for the use of their names, images, and likenesses
through a trust fund.316  The NCAA and membership institutions re-
ceive significant royalties generated by revenue from merchandise
sales.317  However, that revenue does not go to the student-athletes
“whose names and faces . . . drive those sales.”318  The success of the
collegiate merchandising industry is attributable to the student-ath-
letes who gain national recognition and often reach celebrity status
before they graduate from college or move on to professional
leagues.319  This trust fund is distinguishable from the trust fund pro-
posed in O’Bannon, which suggested that student-athletes receive a
312. See Brian Bennett, Big Ten Considers Pay Proposal, ESPN.COM (May 19, 2011, 1:32
PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=6564134 (discussing bridging the gap between
scholarship compensation and life expenses).
313. Texas A&M athletic director, Steve Patterson, revealed that the university will soon be-
gin paying stipends to all student-athletes.  John Taylor, Texas Could Pay Student-Athletes $10K
Annually, NBC SPORTS (Oct. 22, 2014, 4:24 PM), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/
10/22/texas-to-pay-student-athletes-10k-annually/.
314. Jake New, Colleges Inflate Full Cost of Attendance Numbers, Increasing Stipends for Ath-
letes, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 12, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/
08/12/colleges-inflate-full-cost-attendance-numbers-increasing-stipends-athletes.  The value of
these stipends is left to the financial departments of each school to calculate, and some commen-
tators worry that this will be used improperly as a recruiting tool. See id.  The NCAA needs to
be involved with this process to ensure that the stipends are used for the benefit of the student-
athlete and not for an improper purpose.
315. “NCAA President Mark Emmert has openly admitted that student athletes should re-
ceive some compensation for their performances[,]” offering support for providing an “addi-
tional $2,000 cost-of-attendance stipend to student-athletes.”  Mathew R. Cali, Comment, The
NCAA’s Transfer of Power: An Analysis of the Future Implications the Proposed NCAA Trans-
fer Rules Will Have on the Landscape of College Sports, 21 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 217,
246–47, 247 n.179 (2014).
316. Wong, supra note 279, at 1104. R
317. Id. at 1070.
318. Id.
319. See id.
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limited, equal share of NCAA revenue after they graduate.320  In-
stead, an individual trust fund should be set up for each of the confer-
ences and monitored by the NCAA.  A certain percentage of the
revenue from the year would be deposited into the trust fund and dis-
tributed equally among each student-athlete at the end of the season.
Compensation should be split equally amongst the players in each
conference and should not be tied to each player’s performance.  Play-
ers should not be paid differential amounts.  In basketball and foot-
ball, wins are attributable to the joint efforts of teammates; a star
quarterback is not worth much without his teammates.321  Compensat-
ing the players equally “would not destroy the structure of amateur-
ism in college sports,” rather, it would justly compensate the athletes
for the revenue they generate for their respected schools.322
This Comment further proposes that the NCAA should update its
rules so that student-athletes are not restrained from employment op-
portunities or from receiving compensation.  Changes to the NCAA
rules will provide student-athletes a sense of agency as well as an op-
portunity to make “decisions about their careers and capitalize on
their successes, while they are physically capable of doing so.”323  The
NCAA must be involved in overseeing student-athletes’ compensa-
tion to make sure that there are no fraudulent transactions or com-
mercial exploitation.  With commercialization comes “ample
opportunities for unethical behavior that the NCAA’s regulation and
enforcement committees can address.”324  Now, the NCAA is more
important than ever for making sure that student-athletes are pro-
tected from exploitation by professional and commercial enter-
prises.325  Consistent with Northwestern University, student-athletes
should be able to form an independent union to protect their everyday
needs.  It is vital that student-athletes have a voice and a means of
raising grievances with the NCAA.
IV. IMPACT
Ed O’Bannon, the named Plaintiff in O’Bannon, stated: “I’m ex-
cited and trying to keep it all together . . . .  When we decided to take
320. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1105–06 (N.D. Cal. 2014),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-16601, 2015
WL 5712106 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).
321. Standen, supra note 265, at 1113. R
322. Wong, supra note 279, at 1102. R
323. Soederbaum, supra note 163, at 262. R
324. Cali, supra note 315, at 248–49. R
325. A key principle of amateurism is that “student-athletes should be protected from ex-
ploitation.”  NCAA, supra note 22, at 4. R
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on this case [in 2009], we knew it would be a marathon, that it would
get people talking—and that hopefully talk would spark change.  And
here we are.”326  The recent decisions in O’Bannon and Northwestern
University will undoubtedly change the structure of the NCAA.327
The decision in Northwestern University is just one instance where stu-
dent-athletes “may have lost the battle, but [will win] the war” be-
cause changes are already being made.328  It is in the best interest of
the NCAA to consider implementing some reform in reaction to these
lawsuits to better serve the student athletes and prevent future law-
suits that will inevitably follow.329  The reformation of collegiate ath-
letics presents challenges, but they are not insurmountable.330
“Courts [and legislatures] must concede that college athletics has
evolved into an economically driven industry at the expense of [the]
. . . educational values.”331  Both the NCAA and membership institu-
tions turned a blind eye toward the unbalanced nature of the system
while placing utmost importance on the success of their athletic pro-
grams and the revenues they generate.332
The compensation of student-athletes, although met with opposi-
tion, would not cause the downfall of the NCAA or the collegiate
sports industry.333  Student-athletes are already compensated through
their grant-in-aid scholarships.  Unfortunately, the NCAA and its
membership institutions place this fact under the guise that it is
326. Judge Rules Against NCAA, ESPN.COM (Aug. 9, 2014, 6:20 PM), http://espn.go.com/col-
lege-sports/story/_/id/11328442/judge-rules-ncaa-ed-obannon-antitrust-case (second alteration in
original).
327. NCAA Decision Could Change College Sports, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 2014, http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-ncaa-student-athlete-edit-0813-20140813-
story.html; see, e.g., Kevin Trahan, Everything You Need To Know About NCAA’s Coming Ma-
jor Changes, SB NATION (Apr. 21, 2014, 9:19 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/
2014/4/21/5610872/ncaa-changes-union-lawsuits-obannon-kessler.
328. Farrey, supra, note 225 (quoting Nellie Drew, a professor at University of Buffalo who R
previously served as outside counsel for the NHL).
329. Hammond, supra note 227 (example of a lawsuit filed subsequent to Northwestern and R
O’Bannon to receive a fair wage for student-athletes); George Schroeder, Attorney Jeffrey Kess-
ler Files Suit vs. NCAA, Five Richest Conferences, USA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2014, 7:01 PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/03/17/attorney-jeffrey-kessler-files-suit-vs-ncaa-
five-richest-conferences/6520093/ (describing other lawsuits being filed against the NCAA to re-
ceive compensation for student athletes); Trahan, supra note 327 (describing reform in the R
NCAA as a result of recent litigation).
330. Vine, supra note 41, at 266. R
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Mark Edelman, The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win for the
Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to
the Demise of College Sports, 92 OR. L. REV. 1019, 1055 (2014); Standen, supra note 265, at 1119. R
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enough.334  When compared to the large revenues of both the NCAA
and its members, it is clear that it is not enough.335
According to the NCAA, “amateurism is a sine qua non of college
sports” and its rules against revenue sharing with student-athletes are
“necessary for the maintenance of college athletics . . . [to] ‘preserve
amateurism and thereby maintain [a] competitive balance.’”336  Their
claims of financial ruin are unpersuasive.  The NCAA claimed that its
restraints on student athletes’ identities are needed to increase the
popularity of NCAA sports and subsequently “increase output, con-
sumer demand, and consumer value.”337  According to an NCAA self-
commissioned survey, fans would be less likely to watch or attend
sporting events if players were compensated.338  However, as noted in
O’Bannon, the NCAA’s competitive balance is unaffected by provid-
ing student athletes with fair compensation and there are less restric-
tive means available to the NCAA.339  These claims are dubious
because fan attendance and support for collegiate athletics remains
strong even with the suggestion of student-athletes receiving some
form of payment.340  The NCAA and member schools may feasibly
continue to operate profitably if required to compensate student-ath-
letes beyond their grant-in-aid scholarships despite the NCAA’s con-
trary claims.341  To do so, the NCAA would have to first operate as a
more efficient organization by paying high-ranking directors and
coaches with salaries that better reflect the free market.342  Although
334. For example, the Big Ten Commissioner, Jim Delany, stated that “the educational and
lifetime economic benefits associated with a university education are the appropriate quid pro
quo for its student-athletes.”  Matt Hayes, Mark Emmert, NCAA Dig in with Last Stance: Ath-
letes Privileged To Attend College, SPORTING NEWS (Jan. 15, 2015, 9:01 AM), http://www.sporting
news.com/ncaa-football/story/2014-04-18/ncaa-mark-emmert-ed-obannon-case-defense-academ
ic-exceptions-athletes-paying-players-labor-union (quoting Jim Delaney, Big Ten Commis-
sioner).
335. Id.
336. Edelman, supra note 333, at 1040 (quoting Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz,
Neither Reasonable nor Necessary: “Amateurism” in Big-Time College Sports, ANTITRUST,
Spring 2000, at 51).
337. NCAA’s Memorandum of Point & Auths. in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
Motion; Opposition to Antitrust Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion at 18; In re NCAA Stu-
dent-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. (2013) (No. 09-CV-1967-CW), 2013 WL 7855025
at *12 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2014).
338. NCAA’s Memorandum of Point & Auths. in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
Motion; Opposition to Antitrust Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 337, at 12–13.
339. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2014),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-16601, 2015
WL 5712106 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).
340. Edelman, supra note 333, at 1049. R
341. Id. at 1053.
342. See, e.g., Mark Koba, Pay for Play: Some College Players Could Score Big Bucks, NBC
NEWS (Apr. 14, 2014, 10:17 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/careers/pay-play-some-col-
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some fear that corruption would result from paying college athletes, it
would appear that the corruption already exists.343
Some commenters suggest that the NCAA can somehow reform
their rules and structure to preserve the amateur model344 while
others suggest that there should be a free market approach to col-
legiate athletics.345  These suggestions do not fully counter the current
inequalities that exist, or that could occur, if student-athletes were
subject to a complete open market.  Recognizing student-athletes as
employees and compensating them as such is the most beneficial way
to reform the NCAA and its relationship with student-athletes.  As
such, student-athletes will receive the protections that all employees
receive under the law and their compensation will result in a more
equitable relationship with the NCAA.  Further, compensating stu-
dent-athletes as employees will justly compensate individuals who
have a reverse life cycle of employment and counter a sense of age
discrimination.
Because student-athletes will receive additional compensation for
the services they provide, the NCAA will serve an even greater pur-
pose in the future.  The NCAA will continue to be necessary to over-
see college athletics and “prevent any illegal or unethical deals from
occurring.”346  Further, commercialization will make legal representa-
tion necessary for these student-athletes.347  Currently, student-ath-
letes are prohibited from utilizing representation throughout their
lege-players-could-score-big-bucks-n79871 (“Alabama football coach Nick Saban garners a total
package of $5,545,853 a year, making him the highest paid coach in college football.”). See
generally Patrick Hruby, The Free Market Case Against the NCAA Chokehold on College Sports,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 30 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/30/the-free-mar-
ket-case-against-the-ncaa-chokehold-on/?page=all (noting the inefficiency of overcompensating
coaches without allocating that money towards student-athletes: “in the NFL and NBA, coach-
ing staffs earn about seven percent of team payroll; in college football and basketball, they earn
between 200 and 800 percent of team payroll as measured [by] scholarship values”).
343. Koba, supra note 342 (quoting Ellen Staurowsky, Professor of sports management at
Drexel University).
344. See Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the
Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 837,
853–57 (2014) (arguing that the solution to problems with the NCAA is not “professionaliza-
tion,” but rather, efforts to improve a college athlete’s academic experience); see also, M. Tyler
Brown, Comment, College Athletics Internships: The Case for Academic Credit in College Athlet-
ics, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1855, 1891–98 (2014) (arguing that student-athletes should receive aca-
demic credit for their participation in college athletics, which would exempt them from the
payment provisions of the FLSA).
345. See, e.g., Steve Eder, A Legal Titan of Sports Labor Disputes Sets His Sights on the
N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/sports/jeffrey-kessler-
envisions-open-market-for-ncaa-college-athletes.html?_r=0.
346. Cali, supra note 315, at 248.
347. Frank Battaglia, An Evolving NCAA Leading to an Expanding Client List, 13 J. MAR-
SHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 485–86 (2014).
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collegiate careers.348  Now, law firms are anticipating emerging cases
and forming their own college sports practice groups.349  Student-ath-
letes will need representation for contract negotiations, potentially
union representation, and general counseling matters.350
V. CONCLUSION
“[S]ports are a big business, and college sports are no exception.”351
The question posed at this point is one of fairness.  The NCAA and
membership institutions rely on the participation of young student-
athletes to maintain the wealth that goes into their own pockets.  In its
current state, the NCAA only allows a select few to profit significantly
without acknowledging the unfair compensation that the very players
who drive the industry receive.352  These student-athletes deserve the
chance to profit off of their own abilities while they are able to do so.
This Comment proposed that the NCAA should take initiative in
reacting to the recent litigation regarding student-athletes.  The
NCAA should compensate student-athletes not only through their full
grant-in-aid scholarships but also through stipends and an equal share
of a trust fund distributed by each conference.  The NCAA and uni-
versities have profited off the relatively cheap labor of student-ath-
letes for far too long.353  The time for change is now.  With the advent
of this new compensation model, a new and more equitable relation-
ship will form where student-athletes are left with something, as op-
posed to nothing, once their eligibility is over.  It is important for
student-athletes to receive some compensation for their hard work in
making college sports what it is today.  The “free” education they re-
ceive is simply not enough compared to the time and work these ath-
348. See NCAA, supra note 22, at 66 (arguing that further commercialization will lead to a
need for more sports management).
349. Battaglia, supra note 347, at 485.  Notably “Winston & Strawn LLP announced the R
launch of the firm’s college sports practice group.” Id.  The goal is to “provide comprehensive
legal services to clients involved in . . . college and amateur athletics.” Winston & Strawn
Launches College Sports Practice Group, WINSTON & STRAWN (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.winston
.com/en/thought-leadership/winston-strawn-launches-college-sports-practice-group.html.  Nu-
merous other firms also anticipated this new clientele with the reformation of the NCAA. See,
e.g., BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, http://www.bsk.com/practices/4-collegiate-sports (last visited
July 26, 2015); BRYAN CAVE, https://www.bryancave.com/en/practices/sports-and-entertainment-
group/.
350. Practice Areas, Sports Law, BARLOW GARSEK & SIMON, LLP, http://www.bgsfirm.com/
practice-areas/sports-law (last visited October 23, 2015); Preparing Your Student-Athlete for Col-
lege (NCAA Regulation and Legal Issues to Consider), USLEGAL.COM, http://sportslaw.uslegal
.com/preparing-your-athlete-for-college/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
351. Wong, supra note 279, at 1070.
352. Id.
353. Standen, supra note 265, at 1125. R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL108.txt unknown Seq: 41 18-JAN-16 12:25
2015] THE NCAA IS DROPPING THE BALL 211
letes put in as well as the disproportionate amount of profit that the
NCAA and member institutions take in yearly.  The bottom line is if
your job is to play sports, you should be considered an employee and
are entitled to “[a] fair day’s wages, for a fair day’s work.”354
Caroline K. Kane*
354. THOMAS CARLYLE, PAST AND PRESENT 16 (3d ed. 1844).
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2016; B.A and B.S., Loyola University
Chicago, 2013.  I would like to thank Professor Terry Smith as well as the Volume 65 Editorial
Board.  I am especially thankful to my family for their continued love and support.
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